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bills the following twoweeks, though at tire end of the second the Bank
the bill rate twice, toIper cent on February 2?, and to 31/i
per cent onMarch 1,in consonance with rises in the discountrate.
It alsoacquirer! $25 million of government securities in the first of the two
weeks and $2 millionin the second, primarily to enable banks to liqui.
date by selling governmentsecurities instead of borrowing on them.1
Jo the final twomonths prior to the banking holiday, there was nothing
that could becalled a System policy. The System was demoralized. Each
Bank was operating onits own. All participated in tire general atmos-
phere of panic that wasspreading in the financial community and the
community at large. The leadership which an independent central bank-
ing system wassupposed to give the market and the ability to withstand
the pressures ofpolitics arid of profit alike and to act counter to the mar-
ket as a whole,thesethe justification for establishing a quasi-govern.
mental institution with broad powersWere conspicuous by their absence.
6. Alternative Policies
Itis clear that the monetarypolicies followed from 1929 to 1933 were
not the inevitableresult of external pressure. At all times, alternative
policies were available and were being seriously proposed for adoption
by leading figures in theSstem. At all times, the System was tech-
nically in a position to adopt the alternative policies.
To give a clearer idea of the consequences of the policies actually
followed, we consider explicitly the alternatives available at three critical
periods and what their effects might have been. Theperiods are:
)l) the first ten months of 1930;(2) the first eight months of 1931;
(3) the four months following Britain'sdeparture from gold in September
1931. This is followed by an evaluation of thechief justification that has
been offered by writers on Federal Reservehistory for the policy actually
pursued in late 1931 and early 1932, namely. that a shortage of "free
gold" greatly inhibited use of the policy alternatives available to theSystem
until the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act at the end ofFebruary 1932.
The successive banking crises which followed thefirst period and
occurred during the other two were, as we saw in section 2,each more
severe than the preceding. Measuresthat might have been adequate to
cope with the earlier ones would havebeen inadequate for the later ones.
On the other hand, as we shall s"e. the bond purchasesactually made in
the spring and summer of 1932, which did halt thedecline in the stock of
money but ssere inadequate to prevent asubsequent relapse some months
after, would have beers more than adequate to copewith the earlier
crises. As so often in human affairs, a stitch in time savesnine.
Noter, Vol. 111, Jan. 16: Feb.2.6.16.27. 1933: Conversations, Vol. 11.
Jan. 18, 1933. Quotation from Noses.jI. III. Feb. 16, 1933.TFJF. GREAT CONTRACTION
JANUAR\1930 ioEM) OF OC1OCER1930
None of the arguments later advanced in support of the view thate.
pansionary monetary measures by the Federal Reserve System might
have been ineffective or undesirable applieS to this period,as noted
above. There was no sign of lack of confidence in banks by the public,
or of unusual concern by banks about their own sifety. Banks were using
reserves to the full. Any increase in reserves probably would have been
put to use in expanding the assets of banks. Expansionary measures
offered no threat to the gold standard. On the contrary, the goldreserve
was high and goldinflowspersisted. Throughout the twentiesthe
System had been concerned thatit held too large a fraction ofthe
world's gold stock; the only problem about gold that evoked discussion
in 1930 within the System was how to repel the flow. Finally,no serious
monetary difficulties had yet arisen abroad.
To evaluate the possible quantitative effect of an alternative polkv.
let us consider what the effect would have been if the purchaseprogram
actualls' carried out in 1932 had been carried out in 1930 instead; thatis.
if the System had embarked on a pr: am to raise its security holdiigsb
$1 billion during the first ten months of 1930. From December1929 to
October 1930. if we adjustfor seasonal effects, government security
holdings actually rose by $150 million. If some $850 million additional
government securities had been purchased. liisdi-powered money, instead
of declining by $160 million, would have risen by $690million, all of
which would have increased reserves, since during the firstten months of
1930 the public reduced its currency holdings. However, changesin other
forms of Reserve Bank credit might have reduced the impact ofthe lwpo.
thetical auditional purchase. From December 1929to October 1930, bills
bought fell by $1 10 millionIrons $241) millionto $130 millionand bills
discounted fell by $390 millionfrom $590 millionto $200 million. The
purchase of $850 million additionalgovernment securities would doubtless
have produced an even larger declineinhills discounted and less
certainly in bills bought, since banks would hareused some of the funds
to repay borrowings and there might have beena larger demand for bank-
ers' acceptances. To make ratherextreme allowance for such an effect,
let us suppose that discounts and bills boughthad each been reduced to
$50 million. Even then, the effect of thepurchases would have been a rise
in Federal Reserve credit outstandingby $130 million instead of the
actual decline ci .$490 million, anda rise in high-powered money by
$460 million.
If the depositratios had behav cclasinfact they did, the change
from a decline in high-poweredmoney of 2 1.per cent to a rise of 6
per cent would have converted the actual 2per cent decline in the stork
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of money into arise of 7 per cent. Under those circumstances, the de-
posit ratios might havealtered in a direction to offset some of the hy-
pothetical rise iii hiii-powcre d money. flut een very large allowances
on this scorewould hardly change the general conclusion: a rise in the
System's security holdings by $1 billion instead of $150 million in the
first ten months of1930 would have changed the monetary situation
drastically, so drastically that such an operation was almost surely de-
cidedly larger titan was required to convert the decline in the stock of
money into anappreciable rise.
The change in the monetary situation might have affected the gold
movement, reducing the gold inflow or even converting it into a gold out-
flow. But it would havedone that only by its effects on the trend of
economic activity and on the state of the capital markets. Only if the
change in the monetaryclimate had lessened the severity of the economic
contraction and made the capital markets easier, would it have affected
gold flows. But itis l)reciselY the achievement of such results that would
have been the aim of the alternative policies. Hence, a reduction in the
gold inflow wou!d hare been a sign of the success of the alternative policy.
not an offset to it.
The hypothetical purchase of government securities would have reduced
in two was the likelihood of a banking crisis like the one in the fall of
1930: indirectly, through its effect on the severity of the contraction;
and directly through its effect on the balance sheets of banks. The in-
direct effect would have improved the ability of borrowers to repay loans;
the direct effect would have meant that bank reserves weterising sharply
instead of staying roughly stable.Itis impossible to say with any as-
surance that these effectswould have prevented a banking crisis from
occurringthough they might havebut it is certain they would have re-
duced the magnitude of arty crisis that did occurand hence the magni-
tude of its after-effects.
The effects on the capital markets and the reductionin the drain of
gold from the rest of the world would have haddesirable effects abroad.
Again, these might not have prevented thelater financial difficulties
entirely, but they certainly would have eased them.
JANUARY1931TO END OF AUGUST1931
The early months of 1931 were the next crucial timefor monetary policy.
The banking crisis had died down, there were signsof returning confi-
dence in banks and of improving conditions in business.We have al-
ready suggested (section 2that a vigorous monetary push at thattime
might have converted the faint signs of recovery intosustained revival.
Let usuppose that actual policy tothe end of1930, including





months of 193! the System had raised its secuz ity holdiiws h', $!hilijor,
instead of $80 million,after allowing for seasonal changes.During
those eight months, currency held by the public rose by $370UhtilIOlLas a
result of the internal drain on the banking system; bankreserves fell by
$120 million. The difference between the rise in currency and thedecline
in bank reserves, or $250 million, is the amount by which high.pos.,.e
money rose. The purchase of $920 million additionalgovernment se-
curities, with no change in bills discounted or bills bought,would have
raised high-powered money by $1,170 million instead, enoughto meet
the drain of currency that actually occurred and at thesame time to in-
crease bank reserves by $800 million. With such a sizable increase in tiieji
reserves, instead of a decrease of $120 million, banks would hae been
freed from the necessity of liquidating securities, and couldhave reduced
their borrowing from the Reserve System, instead of increasingit by $40
million. The bond market would accordingly have been farstronger, bank
failures would have been notably fewer, and hence theruns on banks
milder if at all appreciabe. En consequence, the drain ofcurrency into
circulation would have been smaller than itwas and the increase in bank
reserves would have been even larger than these figures suggest.
To put the matter as before, in terms of the effecton Federal Re-
serve creditagain assuming that bills discounted and bills bought
would each have been reduced to $50 millionhad theSystem bought
an additional $920 million of government securities during the firsteight
months of 1931, Fcderal Reserve credit outstandingwould have risen by
$470 million instead of $40 million. High-poweredmoney, under these
circumstances, would have risen by $680 millionor by 10 per cent instead
of by 34per cent. Even if both the deposit ratios had fallen byas much
as they did, the result would have beenno change in the stock of money,
instead of a decrease of534per cent.
On this occasion, however, effectsof the change in the monetary
climate on the deposit ratios would clearlyhave enhanced rather than
offset the expansionary effect of thehypothetical open marker purchases.
Depositors would have been far lesseager to convert deposits into currency
and banks, to strengthen still furthertheir reserve position. Both deposit
ratios would therefore have fallenless than thedid. Th second bank-
ing crisis might indeednever have occurred at all in sucha chaned L'one-
tary environment. Once againa $1 billion purchase program would have
been much greater than neededto change drasticafly the monetary situa-
tion. But even if the second bankingcrisis had occurred, andeven if it had been as severe as ttwas, the hypothetical open marketoperation would
have completely eliminated itseffect on the stock ofmoney.
Again, the change would haveproduced a reduction in the inflow of gold and might haveconverted it into an outflow witha resulting easing
98
.of the financial dificties in Europe. And again, this must be counted
an achievementof the hypothetical purchase proeram andnt an offset.
SEPTEMBER 1931 TO END OP JANUARY 1932
We cited earlier the statement in a System memorandum written in No-
'ember 1931 that the "foreiun and domestic drain upon bank reserves
[after Britain's departure from gold) were met in the classic way by in-
creases in discount rates combined with a policy of free lending." The
memorandum included a quotation from the loc,jr class icus of central
bank policy, Bagehot's Lombard Street. In fact, however, the System fol-
lowed Bagehot's policy only with respect to the external drain, not the in-
ternal drain. To meet an external drain, Bagehot prescribed a high Bank
rate, the part of his prescription the System followed. To meet an in-
ternal drain, lie prescribed lending freely. "A panic," he wrote, "in a
word, is a species of neuralgia, and according to the rules of science you
must not starve it. The holders of the cash reserve must be ready not
only to keep it for their own liabilities, but to advance it most freely for
the liabilities of others."139 Despite the assertion to the contrary in the
memorandum, the System gave little more than lip service to this part of
Bagehot's prescription, either before the external drain or after it ended.
True, during the height of the internal and external drain in October, it
permitted its discounts and its bills bought to rise sharply. But this was
at the initiative of the member banks, in spite of sharp rises in the rates
on both, and was a result of the desperate situation of member banks be-
cause of the double drain. As we have seen, even after the height of the
crisis, the New York Bank reduced bill buying rates only gradually and
kept them above market rates, so bills bought declined rapidly. The Sys-
tem took no active measures to ease the internal drain, as it could have
done through open market purchases. Contrast its behavior with that re-
ported approvingly by Bagehot:
The way in which the panic of 1825 was stopped by advancing money
has been described in so broad and graphic a way that the passage has be.
come classical. 'We lent it," said Mr. Hamsan on behalf of the Bank of Eng-
land, "by every possible means and in modes we have never adopted before;
we took in stock on security, we purchased Exchequer bills, we made advances
on Exchequer bills, we not only discounted outright, but we made advances on
the deposit of bills of exchange to an immense amount, in short, by everY
possible means consistent with the safety of the Bank, and we were not on
'is some occasions over-nice.'
Though the response of the System to the external drain was "classic,"
it was sharply at variance with the alternative policy the System had de-
'Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street, London. Henry S. King, 1873. p. 51.
'Lornbard Street, pp. 5l-2.
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veloped during theI920's. the gold sterih7atinrspoivv. ThatPolicy called not for tightness but forease to counter the goldairs and,even more clearly, for ease in the period before andalter t' gold drainto counter the internal drain.
The Systemhad sterilized inflows and outflowsof gold duringthe twenties. It had more than sterilized inflowshorn AUguSt 1929to
1931. Consistent policy called forsterilizing the outflow afterSeptemb 1931 as well. And the Systemwas in an extraordinarily strong
technical position to follow sucha policy. Just before Britain's departure
from the gold standard, the U.S.gold stock was at its highest levelin histoty oven $4.7 billion, and amounted to about40 per cent of theworld's monetary gold stock. The System'sreserve percentage__tratio of its gold holdings to its note and depositliabilities-_exceeded 80 perCent in July, aeraged 74.7 n September, andnever fell below 56.6 in OctoberAt the lowest point, toward the endof October, its goldreserves exceeded legal requirements for cover bymore than $1 biliion)42 And thissum could have been expanded underpressure by $80 million to $200million by simple bookkeepingadjustmcnts.'Further, the ReserveBoard had the legal power to suspendgold reserve requirementswith negligiblesanction5 a power it did in fact invoke inearly 1933.
The major short.termbalances subject to withdrawalwere held by France. French short-termbalances, which had beendeclining since 1929, amounted to $780million in January l93l(out of a total of $1.8
For example, see thememorandum by Benia,niStrong, listing thereasons for the Federal Reserveeasy.nsoney policy of 1924, one ofwhich was. "To check the pressure on the bankingsituation in the Wmt andNorthwest and the resulting failures anddisasters.....(StabiliragjonHearings before the HouseBanking and Currency Committee,69th Cong.. 1stsess., Mar-June 1926: Feb 1927,pp 335-336) One of thetests of Federal Rerve policy,1922-26, that Strongpro- posed was the number ofbank failures (p. 476).See also Adolph Millerof the Federal Reserve Boardon the role of the System inlending to "banks thatare in distressed communities"and supplyingemergency currency needs (pp.861898- 899) ; and W. R. Burgess,then assistant FederalReserve agent of the NewYork Bank, on the powers ofthe System foretabilizatjoincluding "desperate rcmedis for a desperateemergency" (p. 1019).
In contrast. the System'sgold reserve ratiowas only 53 per centat its maxi. mum in 1919 when itpermitted inflation toproceed unchecked and itdid not take contractionary actionin 1920 until theratio had fallen to less than43 per cent.
Federal Rcserertotta in vaults of issuingFederal Reserve Bankswere subject so the same collateral andreserve requireeas notes in circulationOn Oct. 31. 193!, there were about$320 rnillton ofsuch notes in vaultsof issuing Banks According to an internalSystmemoralsdum about $120million in sault would have been adequateHarrison Miscellaneoi,Vol. 1enclosure dated Aug 70, 193!, inletter, dated Aug.21, Harrison toMcDougal). A reductionof $200 million would havereleased $80 million inrequired gold reserves heldagainst the notev If, Instead of 60per cent eligible paper,gold were helda.s Collateral against the notes, an additional$120 million in goldwould have been releasedfrom legal requirements
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bifliOn held by Europeancountriesand by September were around $7(J0
France was strongly committed to staving on gold, and the
French fiiancial Com,nUnstthe Bank of France included, the
greatest concerts aboutthe United States' ability and intention to stay on
the gold standard.That accounted for the special volatility of the French
balances. As ithappened, though the French balances were not with-
drawn in Octoberl93l,'they were almost entirely withdrawn in the
Banking and Monetary Statistics, p. 514. Thete are estimates of short-term
balances held by Franceand allof Europe in reporting New York banks on
Ian. 31, 1931. Thepeak figures a year earlier were $890 million and 52.0 billion,
respectively.
" Harrison informed the Bank of France in Oct. that,ifit did not want to
invest its lunds in the U.S. moneymarket, he preferred not to hold French deposits
in excess of $200 million.lie suggested that it buy gold which would be either
earmarked for the Bank of France or exported to France. The French reprmenta.
tives expressedsurprise at Harrison's willingness to part with gold, but were not
eager to withdrawitat the time because of their fears of posuble inflationary
effects of gold imports on theFrench economy and becau.se of the loss of earnir,gs
to the Bank of France.It was agreed, however, that the Bank of France would
effert a gradual repatriation of asubstantial fraction of its balances in New York
Harrison. Notes. Vol. II, Oct. IS and 26, 1931).
Rumors about Harrison's conversatiortswith the French misrcprmented their
substance: he was said to have requested them not to take moregold from this
country and they had notagreed; and he was said to have committed himself to
maintain a firm money policy. He denied these rumors in akiter to Governor
Meyer:
I have reviewed these matters in somedetail only because of the continued and
repeated reports of an agreement in the nature of a "bargain"whereby the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York surrendered itsfreedom of action regarding
credit or discount rate policies in exchange for apromise from the Bank of
France that it would not withdraw its fundsfrom the market. There was not
any such agreement. nor anysuch bargain. The Bank of France is perfectly free
at any time it chooses to withdrawits dollar funds. The Federal Reserve Bank
of New York is equally free in its creditand discount policies. In fact, there has
never been a time irs anyof my conversations with any central bank when there
was any request or even anysuggmtion that they or we should in any way make
a commitment as to anyfuture policy that would in any way destroy orlimit
our complete freedom of action in our ownself-interest.
These statements by Hart ison are notnecessarily inconsistent with the assertion
be E. A. Goldenweiser, who was director ofthe Board's Division of Research and
Statistics at the time: "The Bank of France atthat time had large depcaitt in the
United States and it was understood by theauthoritiet that, if bill rates in thu
country did not advance, these depositswould be withdrawn in gold."
Without France's asking for a commitmentand without Harrison's entering
into one, the Frencls represerstativcould still have made it clear that theywould
regard failure of the United States toraise discount rates as a sign thatthe
United States was not serious about ittannounced intention to take whatever
measures were necessary to stay onthe gold standard (Harrison,Miscellaneous,
Vol I, letter, dated Dec. 18, 1931, Harrison toMeyer; ibid., letter, dated Dec. 22,
1931, Harrison to Ca!kins, who evidentlyhad accepted the rumors astruth;




spring of 1932146 Their withdrawal in October wouid havemade no
tsltiinate difference in the gold position. It would, however, havereduced
the System's reserve percentage to about 49 per cent and hencemight
have had psychological effects somewhat different front thoseexperienced
when the balances were actually withdrawn, since the System'sreserve
percentage did not then fall below 58 per cent. The lowest thereserve
percentage ever reached during the 1932 open market Operationwas 56
per cent (monthly averages of daily figures). Consequently, itseems
highly likely that, if a gold sterilization policy had beenadopted. gold
outflows would have ceased long before the legalreserve ratio was
reached, let alone before tile gold stock was drastically depleted.
Suppose the System had raised discount rates when it did,adopting
the "classic" remedy for an external drain, but hadaccompanied the
measure by purchase of government securities as called for by the "classic"
reniedy for an internal drain and by it s earlier sterilizationpolicy. Again,
to be concrete, let $1 billion be the amount of the lIvpotls.tica1 increasein
its Security holdings. What v,'ould have been theconseque: e?
Between August 1931 and January 1932, currency held bythe public
rose by $720 million and bank reserves fell by $390 million, whmeans
that, as a result of the increase in discounts and otherminoranges,
high-powered money had risen by $330 million despitethe goirain.
Other items being the same, Reserve purchases of$1 billion ofovern-
ment securities would have meant an increase of $1,330million in high.
'French short-term balances with reporting New Yorkbanks were, on selected dates, in millions:Sept.16, t931, $685; Dec. 30, 1931, $549; MayII, 1932, $304; June 15, 1932, $102; june 29, 1932, $49 (Bankingand Monetary Statistics,
pp. 574-575). The statistics include all deposits and short-termsecurities held by the French at reporting domestic banks andbankers, but they may not include
other American short-term liabilities to FrenchCitizens, such as bills and short-term
securities held for them by agents other than thereporting banks. Hence these figures may underestimate French withdrawals.
Governor Harrison denied that the ultimatewithdrawal of French short-term
balances reflected French dissatisfaction with thechange in Federal Reserve policy in the spring of 1932, though thatwas widely reported. He said, '[S]orne people might argue that our policy had beenresponsible for the recent heavy outflow of gold, but we know that it war largely therepatriation of central bank balances whirls would have been withdrawn inany case" (Notes, Vol. II, June 30. 1932).
" Goldenweiser asserts the contrary, writingthat "a full-fledged easing policy by whsch he clearly mears, from thecontext, low discount rates, rather thanopen market operations]-. would have involved a suspenrjors of reserve requirements
against Federal Reserve deposits'(ArnericaMonetary Policy, p. 159). However, Goldenweiser gives no evidence tosupport his assertion. It may have been the opinion of the authorities at the time,tlsough we have been ableto find no internal document in the GoldenweiserPapers or in the Harrison Papers and no reference in the Harnlin Diary indicating thatsuch a POlICY was ever sericusly contemplated or its consequences for thereserve ratio explicitly considered. These documents make the rite in discountrates appear to be more nearlya conditioned reflexthan a policy decision reachedafter full considerationof a range of feasible alternatives.
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powered money. That sum would have provided the
whole $720 million
in currency withdrawn by the public and at the same timehave rnh!
bank reserves te increase by $610 million instead ofdecreasing by $390 million, or one-eighth of their initial level. Theincrease in bankreserves would have permitted a multiple expansion in depositsinstead of the multiple contraction that actually took place.
Of course, under these circumstances, banks wouldhave been under
far less heavy pressure than they were and would haveborrowed less from
the Reserve System, thereby offsetting some of the hypotheticalincrease
in high-powered money. However, this offset would havereflected fewer
bank failures and a reduction in the public's desireto convert deposits
into currency. Hence, the currency held by the publicwould have risen
less than it did. The net effect of these offsetting factorson bank reserves
might have been either expansionary or contractionai-y
Again, to suggest orders of magnitude, suppose that fromAuust 1931
to January 1932. discounts and bills bought had both remainedun-
changed instead of the first rising from $280 millionto $840 million, and
the second falling from $310 million to $100 million. Evenunder these
assumptions, a purchase of $1 billion of governmentsecurities would have
meant a risein high-powered money by $650 millionmore than the
actual rise. Even if we couple these assumptions with the furtherextreme
assumption that, under such greatly improved monetaryconditions, the
deposit ratios would have fallen as much as they didand forthe deposit-
currency ratio, the fail in so short a time was the largest on recordthe
result would have been to cut the decline in the stock ofmoney to less
than half the actual decline from August 1931 to January 1932.Only a
moderate improvement in the deposit-currency ratioa declinefrom
8.95 to 7.10 instead of to 6.47would, under these hypotheticalcir-
cumstances, have enabled the stock of money to be stable instead of
falling by 12 per cent.
The crises were becoming successively moresevere, so this time the
$1 billion we have been using as our standard is not,as in1k....lier
periods, clearly a multiple of the amount requiredto turn the nlonetarv
tide. But these calculations suggest that an open market purchaseof
that size would have been adequate. And with so greata change in the
monetary tide, the economic situation could hardly have deteriorated so
rapidly and sharply as it did.
THE PROBLEM OF FREE GOLD
In the book he published after retiring from the System, from whichwe
quoted above, Goldenweises- analyzed briefly the System's reaction to
Britain's departure from gold. After discussing the rise in discount rates
in reaction to the external drain, which heterms a "brief return to
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ortooy'u45 which 'hai only pcingand temporary CfTeb Oflthe banking system or on the course of the depression,"he went on tosay, with respect to the internal drain:
More serious was the fact that the Systemdid not extend SUffiCjCnCaid ti) member banks through discounting theirpaper and that itfailed topursue a vigorous policy of purchases in the open market. Forthis failure of the System
to give more help in an emergency the major blame ison the law whichpre- scribed rigid rules for the eligibility of paper fordiscount and also barrmj
governnsent SCcUrities from collateral acceptable for FederalReserve noses.''
The problem to which Goldenweiser referred isthe so-called free-gold
problem. The internal drain had increased the volumeof Federal Reserve
notes outstanding. The law specifled that the System holdagainst notes
a reserve of 40 per cent in gold and additional collateralof 60 percent in either gold or eligiblepaper (which consisted of commercialagri-
cultural, or industrial loans, or loans secured byU.S. governmentsecurities
rcdiscounted b' member banks; loans to memberbanks secured bypaper eligible for rediscount orbygovernment securities; and bankers'ac- ceptances,i.e.,"bills bought" in the terminology ofFederal Reserve
accounts). Because the System did not haveenough eligible paperto furnish 60 per cent of the collateral forFederal Reserve notes,part of the
gold in excess of minimum requirementshad to be pledged for thispur-
pose. The amount of free gold not neededto meet either minimum gold
requirements or collateralrequrements was therefore less than theamount of excess gold reserves. The FederalReserve System, in its AnnualR-por: for 1932, and Goldenweisei-, inthe passage quoted above andelsewhere in his book, assert that the shortageof free gold was an importantfactor preventing the System fromeagaging in larger open marketpurchases, such as the hypothetical purchasesdscussd in the precedingsubsection. Such purchases, theyassert, would have reduced eligiblepaper holdings still further by reducingrediscounts and therefore couldhave been con- duetri! only to avery limited extent withouteliminating free gold en- tireiv. The Glass-SteagaliAct of February 27, 1932.disposed of that problembypermitting government bondsin the Reserve Ranks' portfolios
as well as eligible paper toserve as collateral against FederalReserve notes in addition to the 40per cent minimum gold reserve.'°
Our own examination ofthe evidence leadsus to a different conclu-
However, while discountrazes wcre raised at all ReserveBanks in Oct or Nov. 1931, they werC reduceda few months later only in Dailasand Richmond and New York. The reductionin New Yorkwas made more than four months after the second rise in Oct.193!, and brought 'hediscount rate only one-quarter of the way back so thelevel before the golddrain. Four months later,a seccnd reduction was made in NewYork to 2per Cent-_only halfway backto the level before thc gold drainwherethe rate remained untilraised again in March 1933. 'Amerjcan MonetaryPolicy, pp. 159-160.
See footnote 26 above,for other provisions ofthe G!ass-Sieagall Act
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sion. Despite the attention it has since received,we do not believe a
shortage of lice gold exeitod any major influenceon Federal Reserve
policy, for five reasons.
The earliest published full-dress discussionof free gold during
the 1929-33 contraction we have foundisan article by Benjamin
Anderson intheChase Economic BuIlelznof September 29,1930
Anderson, a firm believer in the real bills doctrine andan equally firm
opponent of open market Operations, warned, "There isnot enough free
gold to justify artificially cheap nloney."15' We have foundno evidence
that the article exerted any influence within the Reserve System.In any
event, by the time it appeared, New York had already lost itsbattle for
expansionary open market purchases, and the general lineswhich were
to dominate policy until the spring of 1932 had already beenset.
The earliest unpublished System documenton free gold we have
found is a memorandum by Goldenweiser, written on Janua'3, 1930.
He refers to a Board discussion of a statement by Anderson'that free
gold was down to $600,000,000 .....(in an address to theAmerican
Economic Association and American Statistical Associationon December
30, 1929)Anderson concluded, "The Federal Reserve Systemis nearing
the time when it must look to its own reserve ...." Thememorandum
makes clear that the Reserve System regulady kept track of freegold.
and that its level was not at the time a source of concernto the Board.
The limited attention paid to free gold by the System issuggested by
the fact that the earliest mention of free gold we have found in the Hamlin
Diary is an entry of July 30, 1931, and in the Harrison Papers,a pre-
liminary memorandum, August 3, 1931, for the meeting of theOpen
Market Policy Conference on August 11. Both noted that free goldon
July 29 totaled $748 million and that internal bookkeeping adjustments,
involving reduction of Federal Reserve notes in the tills ofmost Reserve
Banks to a "reasonable minimum," would have raised the free goldon
that date to $1,086 million.152 A later memorandum of August 21, 1931,
prepared at the New York Bank considered the likely effecton free gold
of a variety of alternative hypothetical developments including large-scale
open market purchases, internal drain of notes and gold, and an external
drain and concluded that, even under rather extreme assumptions, free
Anderson had referred to the significance of free gold in a Mar. 14, 1930.
article(p.13)indicatinghis intentionto discuss the subject fullylater,as
he did in the Sept. 1930Bui'letinarticle, 'The Free Gold of the Federal Reserve
Sysim and the Cheap Money Policy"(p. 8). W. R. Burgess told the Board
that a subsequent article by Anderson on gold(Chose Economic Bulletin,Mar. 15,
1931) did much damage abroad to the Federal Reserve System (Hamlin, Diary,
Vol. 19, Oct. 30, 193, p. 173).
uSee Goldenweiser Papers, ContainerI,folder of Confidential Memoranda,
1922-33; New York T,me, Dcc. 31, 1929, which refers to Anderson's address;
Hamlin, Diary, Vol. 19, p. 132; Harrison, Open Market, Vol. 11.(I
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go!d did not constitute an important limitation on the alternatives avail.
able to the SvstemY5° The preliminary memorandum for the October 26
meeting of the Open Market Policy Conference noted there had been
little change in free gold as a result of the gold outflow. Excess goldre-
serves had declined from $1.9 billion on September 16,1931, to $1.1
billion on October 21, but free gold reserves had been roughlyconstant
at over $0.8 billion because of a rise in eligible paper holdings. The pre-
liminary memorandum for the November 30, 1931, meeting did noteven
refer to free gold, though tt did note,there is still plenty of gold left.
After the first of the year, free gold may have fallen as low as $400 million
during January and February 1932, which could have been raisedto
perhaps $525 million by bookkeeping adjustments.° Hence the actual
amount of free gold throughout the whole period was sufficient to have
permitted extensive open market operations.
(3While free gold was alluded to from time to time at meetings of
the Conference or of its executive committee or of the Federal Reserve
Board or of the New York Bank directors, it was almost always mentioned
as a problem by persons who had opposed open market operations all
along on other grounds; it was never given as the principalargument
against purchases, and the objections raised on this score almostalways
were immediately countered by figures showing that a shortage of free
gold offered no serious limitation to po1icy.t5Itis impossible to read
UI Its hit letter transmitting thememorandum to all governoa, Harriion con-
cluded, 'apart from the position of individual Reserve banks thesystem as a whole
has ample funda to deal with any situation withinreason which may arise, and that
in matters of policy we are probably in a position to do whateverseems wise for
the country's economy."
The memorandum stated the immediate effect of thepurchase of $300 million
of government bonds would be a reduction of about $137million in free gold,
leaving the System about $600 million, which could beincreased to more than
$900 million by reducing Federal Reserve notes in vaultsof the Reserve Banks. A
large increase in the demand for Federal Reservenotes or for gold, according to
the statement, would not affect the free gold positionbecause that increase would
be accompanied by an increase in Federal Reserve discountsand bill holdings,
which would supply eligible paper collateral for Federal Reservenotes and release geld used for that purpose. Gold then inuse as collateral, exclusive of free gold,
was sufficient to provide a 40 per cent reserve for more than $3 billion of addi.
tional note circulation, or to provide $l% billion ofgold for export (Miscelianecua, Vol. I).
MOpen Market, Vol. 11. Nocontinuous figures on free gold during thenitical
period, Sept. 1931Feb. 1932, were shown eitherin theAnnual ReportorFederal Reserve Bulletinfor 1931 and 1932, and we have been ableto find none in any
System publication since. Our estimates forJan. and Feb. 1932 are based en a chart irs Federal Reserve Board.Annual Reportfor 1932, p. 17, plus amounts of
their own notes held by issuing Banks, p.9l.
'At the Aug.Il, 193!, meeting of the Open MarketPolicy Conference,
Governors Calkint and Seay said, inresponse to Harrison's recommendation of
substantial purcha.set of government securities,their Banks did not hold enough free gold to permit them to participate infurther purchases. Governor Harrison
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in full the record of proceedings of the OpenMarket PolicyConference and of meetings of the New York Bankdirectors during theperiod frotn September 1931 through February 1932and assigngrest signific50to free gold as a factor determining policy. The
closest approachto serious concern was expressed in January and Febnsa
1932, when theClass. Steagall Act was in process of enactmentand the problemjwas on its way to solution.lse Concern over the gold problem duringthe periodcentered
cited the figures on free gold in the memorandumof Aug. 3, 193j,referred to above, and pointed Out that 'the question to decide
W55 not whether indivjdu5l banks could, or could not, participate, but tOtry to agree ona System policy which would be helpful." When the Conference with the Board laterthat day, Governor Meyer asked if "there was any dangerto the System" inauthorizing the executive committee to purchase $200 millionor $300 million ofgovernnjt bonds. "Mr. Goldenweiser stated that therewas no danger in thatdirection a, we have $750,000,000 free gold which can be increased
to $1,000,000,000 bywith. drawals from the agents" (Harrison. Open Market, Vol.II). At a meeting of the executive committee of thedirector, of the NewYork Bank on Oct. 5, Owen D. Young asked how tht purchase
of governmentsecurities by the Reserve Banks "wouldfitinto the proposed plan"for a corporation eventually designated the National Credit Corporation.
Harrison answered, "that he considered the gold position of the Systemparamount at this time, andon that account would not be inclined to purchase Government
securities." Three days later, however, at a board meeting of the New YorkBank, Harmon said "thatthe amount of free gold held by the System had not been
materially affected by the recent loss of gold, so that there wa., still considerable leeway
for PUrehases of Government securities" (Notes, Vol. II, Oct. 5, 8, 193fl.
At the Oct. 26, 1931, meeting of the Conference, Harrisonsaid that "the free gold position of the System wa., not a considerationat this time" (Open Market,
Vol. II). On Oct. 27, Goldenweiser reported to the Boardthat free gold had been maintained despite the gold export, of the preceding fiveweeks (Hamlin, Diary, Vol. 19, pp. 169-170). No reference was madeto free gold at the Nov. 30, 1931,
meeting oí the Conference, which authorised the eXeCutiveConsmnittee to buy up to $200 million of government securities before the end ofthe year (Open Market, Vol. II).
The earliest mention of the free gold problemwe have found in publications of
the Federal Reserve Board is in theBulletin,Sept. 1931, pp. 495-496 Theterm is defined and a chart is presented showing free goldand excei reserves of the
Reserve Banks from 1925 on. It is referred to again in thBulletin, Nor.1931, p. 604. No mention of free gold is made in theAnnual Reportfor 1931. In neither
that report nor any earlier one is there a suggestion oflegislation to meet such a problem, though it was standard procedure for the ReserveSystem to list legislative
recommendations in its reports. TheAnnual Reportfor 1932, in comlnentiisg on
the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, contains the first discussionof frte gold in the annual reports.
On Jan. 4. 1932, Harrison told the executive committeeof the New York
Bank that "his only hesitancy in recommending" substantialpurchases of govern.
ment bonds wa.s on account of the relatively small amount of freegold "we now
have at our disposal," and for that reason the Reserve Banksshould have authority
to pledge all their assets as collateral for Federal Reserve notes (Notes,Vol. II, Jar.. 4, 1932).
I-lit hesitancy did not prevent his urging open market purcha.sesat the Jan. 11,
1932, meeting of the Conference (see sect. 5, above). At the Feb.24 meeting just
before the enactment of the Gla.ss-Steagall bill,the System's failure to pursueT}IE GREAT CONTRACTION
not in the Federal Reserve System butin the White House arid Treasury.
At a conference with Congressional leaders onOctober 6, 1931, President
Hoover presented the proposals eventually embodied in the Glass-Steagall
Act.uT
(4) If free gold had been a serious handicap to adesired policy, fea3ible
measures fully consistent with pastpolicies of the System were available,
even during the height of the golddrain, to relieve the free gold problem.
(a) The bookkeeping adjustments referred to above were apparently
exploited to some extent, but by no means fully (b) Bills could have been
purchased instead of government securities, since they were eligible as
collateral for Federal Reserve notes. After rising sharply during the height
of the crisis (SeptemberOctober, 1931)holdings declined continuously
from October 1931 to February 1932. because buying rates were kept
above market rates.'(c) Member banks could have been encouraged
activelybillpurchases, discount ratereduction, and "buying of Government
securues,ifnecessary, facihtated by alleviation of free gold position," recom-
mended on Jan. 11, was explained as follows:
Continued uncertainties in the domestic situation, as well as a large drain of
gold to Europe and particularly to France, stimulated by fear of inflation in
this country, have been important factors in making it seem undesirable to carry
through art aggressive programof reduction in discount rates and purchases of
Goverment securities. The relatively small amount of free gold held by the
ready., system was a further major factor in limiting the possibilities of purchases
of Government securities (Open Market, Vol. II, minutes of meetings, Jan. Ii,
and Feb. 24, 1932).
Hoover, Memoirs, pp. 115-118; see also Benjamin Anderson, "Our Gold
Standard Has Not Been in Danger for Thirty-Six Years," Chase Economic Bul-
letin, Nov. 10, 1932, p. 10.
" On behalf of the System it could be claimed that the decline was not its own
choice, that 115 buying rate on acceptances was below the rediscount rate, but New
York City banks, which alone had bills, were substantially out of debt to the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York by Nov. 1931 and hence had no incentive to
sell (H. H. Villard, "The Federal Reierve System's Monetary Policy in 1931 and
1932," Journal of Political Economy, Dec. 1937, p. 727). The crucial point, how-
ever, is the relation of the buying rate, not to the rediscount rate, but to the
market rate. As Villard has pointed out, fromAug. 1931 through Oct. 1931, while
the System's bill holdings were expanding, its buying rate was at or below the
market rate; thereafter its buying rate wasto % percentage point above the
market rate (ibid., pp. 728-732). lIthe Reserve Bank had lowered the buying rate,
the New York banks would have sold their acceptances to it. The New York
Bank was fully aware that the relevant consideration was the relation of the
buying rate to the market rate and not to the rediscount rate,as its actions
in Aug. 1929 show. On Jan. 21,1932, Harrison told his board of directors,
"[W]e should probably have lowered our bill rates because they lardwell above
the effective market rates and our portfolio of billi [uI rapidly diminishing'
(Harrison, Notes, Vol. Il.
Benjamin Anderson, who argued thatthe availability of free gold was a
constraint on Federal Reserve expansionary policies (which, as we have noted,
he opposed), nevertheless denied that the Class-Steagall Actwas essential to
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to increare their discounts. At all times there was ample eligiblepaper in
the portfolios of member banks.'9 Goldensveiser and othersrecopflj7. this
but say that the oniy way to increase the amount irs the handsof the
Federal Reserve Banks would have been to sell bonds andthereby force
member banks to discount.'° They add, quite correctly, thatsuch a step
would have been deflationary. However, that was not theonly way.
Failure of banks to discount was partly a consequence of thelong-stand
ing Federal Reserve pressure against Continuous borrowing. In 1929,the
System went be'ond that and resorted to "direct pressure" to dissuade
member banks from discounting for particular purposes. It wouldhave
been easier to use direct pressure to persuade member banks in 1931or
109
relieve the constraint. He listed alternatives available for irscriraaing the supply
of free gold similar to those listed in our item 4. Concerising 40 (b) hewrote;
Moreover, it would have been very easy to increase the volume of open-market
acceptances available for purchase by the Federal Reserve Banks, by concerted
policy involving the cooperation of banks and great business corporations__a
proposal of this sort was actually made by important industrial leaders ("Our
Gold Standard Has Not Been in Danger,' p. 9).
'See the figures on country and reserve city member banks' holdings of eligible
assets, including eligible paper and U.S. government securities not pledged against
national bank note circulation, on June 30 or at call dates, June 1926 through Dec.
1932, Federal Reserve Board. Annual Report for 1932, p. 126.
Holdings of eligible paper, including paper under rediscount, were four times as
large as member hank borrowissgs, when this ratio was at a low point in Dec.
1931. 01 course, member bank borrowings were secured by U.S. government
securities as well as by eligible paper so the possibility of increased borrowing on
the basis of eligible paper holdings in Dec. 1931 is understated.
On Mar. 24, 1932, in Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency on S. 4115 (National and Federal Reserve Banking System, 72d Cong,
1st sen., p.109), Senator Glass remarked, "Let me say that in an interview I
had with him as late as last Saturday evening, the chief of banking operations in
the Federal reserve system stated to me that the banks had ample eligible paper."
Holdings of eligible paper were also widely ditsributed, according to figures
Glass presented during the Senate debate on the Gla.ss-Steagall bill. He said he
supported the section of the bill that permitted banks without eligible paper to
rediscount other security satisfactory to the Reserve Banks, not because banks no
longer held adequate amounts of eligible paper, but because of the çycho!ogical
effect of the measure in freeing the fear-ridden banks from their inhibition to
rediscount the eligible paper they owned (Corsgressicnsal Record, Senate, Feb. 17,
1932, p. 4137; see also H. P. Willis and J. M. Chapman, The Banking Si:siation,
New Yosk, Columbia University Press, 1934, pp. 678-679).
'Goldenweiser, American Monetary Policy, p. 160; and Federal Reserve Board,
Annual Report for 1932, p.lB. Benjanun Anderson believed force would riot
have been necessary:
They (theFederal Reserve Banks] could have done this[sold government
securities] without force, by arrangement with the great banks of the country in
such a way as to tighten money markets little,if at all,ifit were done in
concert and as a matter of general policy ("Our Gold Standard Has Not Been
in Danger," p. 9).
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1932to increase their discounts, since thatcould li,ice hero 5Ih1(Itprotst.
ablefor member banks.16'
(5) Finally, enactmentofthe Glass.Steagall Act or February 2?, 1932,
entirely removed the problem of free gold. Vet, as we have seen, its
enactment did not lead to a change in Federal Reserve policy. The large.
scale open market operation of 1932 was begun six weeks later primarily
because of Congressional pressure and was allowed to lapse not long after
Congress adjourned.
The conclusion seems inescapable that a shortage of free gold did n
in fact seriously limit the alternatives open to the System. The amount
wasat all times ample to support large open market purchases. A shortage
was an additional reason, at most, for measures adopted primarily on
other grounds. The removal of the problem did not of itself lead to change
of policy. The problemoffree gold was largely an cx post justification
for policies followed, not an ex ante reason for them.
'' The System need only have offered to discount snersiber hank paper backed
by government securities (which conntitutd accepal'lc collateral for Federal Re.
serve noteS) at a rate below the market yield on government securitiesUnder
Secretary of the Treasury Milit apparently made that recommendation to the Open
Market Policy Conference meeting on Jan. 11 and 12, 1932. The Treasury, which
had to raise $1!4 billion by June 30, wanted to encourage bank subtcrption,
in the face of a severe depreciation in government securities since Sept. 1931.
"The inclination of banks to subscribe would be increased by rcduction of Federal
reserve discount rates to give some differential between those rates and the yields
on government securities.If banks can be induced to borrow anti buy the net
effect must be an expansion of credit"(Harrison, Open Market, Vol. 11). No
action was taken on the recommendation.
Suggestion of a "variation of the 'direct pressure' method, tried unsuccessfully
in 1929," namely, 'borrowing ... would not be frowned upon by the Federal
Reserve Banks," was made inI 93C by a New York Bank director, but it was not
considered to be a practical sotutiori of the problem (Notes, Vol. 1, May 26, 1930).
Individual Reacrue Banks must have differed at any given time in the encourage.
ment to discount they gave their member banks. See, for example, Charles E.
Mitchell's comments on the San Francisco Bank, which suggest that it was not
liberal inits interpretation of eligibility requirements (Notes, Vol. 11, Oct.15.
1931). Even Harrison, who in Oct. 1931 recosnissended that New York City banks
borrow freely front the System "what was steceasary to niCet the needs of the
situation," hesitated to call bankers in to see him in this connection, because 'we
must be prepared to have our action construed as an invitation to come in and
borrow from this bank and to do something with the funds thus obtained. This
procedure would, therefore, have itsresponsibilities." Owen D. Young said he
wanted "to stop, look, and listen," before proceeding "by callinggroup meetings
of bankers and by issuing what will be,inseffect, an invitation to the member
banks to come in and borrow at this hank" (Notes, Vol. II, Oct. 26, 1931; Mar.
24. 1932).
Clark Warburton nsaintains that, far from encouraging discountingat a means
of getting more eligible paper, "as bank failures became frequent,the Federal
Reserve banks developed an extremely hard.boiled attitude towardmember banks
which needed to borrow to meet deposit withdrawals"("Has Bank Supervision
Been in Conflict with Monetar; Policy?", RenewofEcononiict and S:atuticc,
Feb. 1952, pp. 70-711.